Understanding, Truth, and Epistemic Goals by Khalifa, Kareem
 0 
Understanding, Truth, and Epistemic Goals 
Kareem Khalifa 
Department of Philosophy 
Middlebury College 
Middlebury, VT 05753 
kkhalifa@middlebury.edu 
 
Abstract: Several argue that truth cannot be science’s sole epistemic goal, for it would fail to do 
justice to several scientific practices that advance understanding. I challenge these arguments, 
but only after making a small concession: science’s sole epistemic goal is not truth as such; 
rather, its goal is finding true answers to relevant questions.  Using examples from the natural 
and social sciences, I then show that scientific understanding’s epistemically valuable features 
are either true answers to relevant questions or a means thereof.  
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1. Introduction.  Understanding has garnered increasing attention among philosophers of 
science. Arguably, understanding’s relation to truth is the most vexing topic in this burgeoning 
literature. This relation can be explored in multiple ways. Perhaps the most familiar to 
philosophers of science is to find clear cases in which scientific understanding was achieved, and 
then to discern whether any falsehoods played a role in this achievement. However, from early 
on, virtually everyone has agreed that falsehoods play some role in understanding. We should 
now focus on which roles these falsehoods play. 
 Progress on this front requires identifying the specific epistemic goals that these 
falsehoods promote. So construed, debates about understanding and truth’s relation are fruitfully 
transformed. Intuitively, truth is one of science’s epistemic goals. But can falsehoods be a means 
to truth? If so, would this exhaust the role that they serve in understanding?  
 Some answer these questions negatively (De Regt 2017, Elgin 2017, Potochnik 2017). 
For instance, Elgin (2017, 16) claims that “an adequate epistemology should explain what makes 
good science cognitively good. Too strict a commitment to truth stands in the way.” By contrast, 
I will argue that such a commitment does not stand in the way of explaining science’s cognitive 
goods. I defend this claim not out of any deep love of the truth. Rather, I am motivated by the 
conviction that many reasonable scientific axiologies will accord epistemic value to 
understanding. Hence, against Elgin and others, I claim that a truth-centric or “veritistic” 
axiology is one way to account for scientific understanding’s epistemic value. Importantly, 
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however, I don’t claim it’s the only way to do so. At root, then, I defend veritism largely to 
promote a kind of pluralism or tolerance about scientists’ core epistemic goals.1 
Lest this all seem abstruse, philosophical accounts of epistemic goals serve several 
functions. First, they account for methodological norms, as presumably, methodology is a means 
to achieving the goals of inquiry. Second, they can inform accounts of scientific progress, which 
consists in advancing the goals of inquiry. Third, they can explain scientific success—a staple of 
the scientific realism debates—which consists in realizing the goals of inquiry. Thus, debates 
between veritists and their understanding-adoring interlocutors have implications for 
methodology, progress, and realism. 
I proceed as follows: section 2 motivates and clarifies my thesis; sections 3 and 4 
consider different candidates for epistemically valuable features of understanding, showing that 
all of them are derivative of veritistic value, or else are of dubious epistemic value.  
 
2. Understanding and Truth. Several have argued that veritistic conceptions of science cannot 
do justice to science’s aim of understanding phenomena. In this section, I clarify the exact 
contours of this clash between truth and understanding. Let’s begin by characterizing the relevant 
kind of objections to veritism, which I’ll call “understanding objections:” 
U1. If veritism is true, then feature X of understanding is not epistemically valuable. 
U2. X is epistemically valuable. 
U3. \ Veritism is false.  
 
1 For similar reasons, one might also regard my arguments as serving the kind of “voluntaristic” 
epistemologies that Chakravartty (2017) and van Fraassen (2002) defend.  
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My central aim is to show that understanding objections are unsound. I will not be offering a 
positive argument for veritism.  
Before doing so, I define this argument’s key terms. Traditionally, “veritism” denotes the 
position that science’s only epistemic goal is truth.2 By “epistemic goal,” I mean that which can 
serve as the goal of a scientific inquiry, where inquiries are networks of interrelated questions 
and answers.3 Thus, if understanding is an epistemic goal, then when scientists ask certain 
questions, their goal is to understand. If truth is an epistemic goal, then when scientists ask 
certain questions, their goal is to discover the truth. 
This emphasis on questions suggests an important revision to veritism. Traditionally, 
veritists have prized true statements or beliefs. Instead, I defend “inquisitive” veritism, wherein 
the only epistemic goal of science are true answers to relevant questions.4 The move from 
traditional to inquisitive veritism shifts the debate’s terms. In particular, friends of understanding 
may be right to criticize traditional veritism, but I’ll argue that they’re wrong to criticize 
inquisitive veritism. Indeed, hereafter, “veritism” denotes inquisitive veritism. 
 
2 Kitcher (2002, 550) provides a representative statement: “Veritism: Science aims to accept… 
true statements.” 
3 The distinction between epistemic and non-epistemic value is notoriously difficult to explicate 
in a theory-neutral manner. The “goals-of-inquiry” explication adopted here is the most common 
theory-neutral explication of this distinction in epistemology. Alternative ways of forging this 
distinction are not discussed here. 
4 Khalifa and Millson (2020) propose and elaborate in greater detail a kindred position, 
“inquisitive truth monism.” 
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Such a shift also requires us to say a bit about when questions are relevant. At root, it 
suffices for my purposes if the questions that I invoke are questions that scientists would deem 
relevant in paradigmatic contexts. More speculatively, at least three contextual factors determine 
questions’ relevance. First, scientists may find questions interesting, either for practical reasons 
or out of sheer curiosity. Second, scientists may be obligated to answer certain questions owing 
to their role-responsibilities. These responsibilities are frequently marked by scientists’ areas of 
expertise. Third, when scientists find one question relevant, they may then be on the hook for 
answering several “sub-questions” that are required to answer their original question.  
Additionally, I assume that something is epistemically valuable just in case it instantiates 
or is an effective means to realizing an epistemic goal. Thus, according to understanding 
objections, some epistemically valuable features of understanding are neither true answers to 
relevant questions nor effective means for arriving at such answers. I will argue that this claim is 
unsubstantiated. 
To do so, sections 3 and 4 consider understanding’s prima facie epistemically valuable 
features: truth-enough, empirical adequacy, explanation, inference, non-propositional 
representation, systematicity, salience, and cognitive skill. These are drawn from those who most 
explicitly distance understanding from truth (De Regt 2017, Elgin 2017, Potochnik 2017); a 
fortiori, their critics would more readily accept veritism. If each member of this list can be 
shown to: (a) consist of true answers to relevant questions, (b) be an effective means of acquiring 
these answers, or (c) be non-epistemically valuable, then my defense of veritism is achieved.5  
 
5 A single feature of understanding might exhibit all three of these kinds of value. I simply 
highlight the kind of value that (in my opinion) the feature most readily embodies. 
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3. Understanding’s Veritistic Value. An understanding objection’s first premise, U1, states that 
if veritism is true, then some feature of understanding is not epistemically valuable. As I will 
now show, veritists have ample resources for bestowing epistemic value upon many of 
understanding’s features: truth-enough, empirical adequacy, explanation, inference, non-
propositional representation, and systematicity. Hence,  understanding objections appealing to 
these features are unsound. 
 
3.1. Truth-Enough. Abstractions, approximations, and idealizations are all thought to 
provide understanding while being false. A successor-concept, such as Elgin’s “truth-enough” or 
Potochnik’s “representation as-if,” is frequently proposed in truth’s stead. Propositions are true 
enough just in case they’re close enough to the truth to achieve one’s epistemic goals. For this to 
undercut veritism, true enough propositions could be neither true answers to relevant questions 
nor a means to acquiring such answers. However, true enough propositions appear capable of 
serving either role. Thus, they pose no challenge to veritism.6 
Begin with abstractions, in which certain truths are omitted. Precisely what gets 
abstracted appears to be a function of which questions are relevant. For instance, Schelling’s 
(1971) model of segregation omits organizational practices and specialized communication 
systems as causes of segregation in order to answer the highly circumscribed question, “How 
 
6 Using various equations of state as examples, Khalifa and Millson (2020) provide a more 
extensive veritistic treatment of idealizations, discuss approximations of a very different sort, and 
do not discuss abstractions at all. 
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could segregation result from the interaction of individual choices?” Moreover, since Schelling is 
only looking for a possible (rather than an actual) way for segregation to occur via individual 
choices, his model provides a true answer to this question.7 Thus, models with abstractions can 
still provide true answers to relevant questions. Consequently, abstractions don’t threaten 
veritism. 
Next, consider approximations, in which something is close to the truth, but not perfectly 
accurate. Here, we should distinguish between: (i) the true claim that approximately, p and (ii) 
the false but approximately true claim that p. Since the former is true and not merely true 
enough, veritism allows it to serve as an answer to a question. Moreover, questions often dictate 
suitable standards of approximation. For example, in their empirical evaluation of Schelling’s 
hypothesis, Bobo and Zubrinsky (1996) appear to be answering questions such as, “Controlling 
for age, occupation, education, and sex, how strongly do whites’ in-group preferences correlate 
with their preferences to live in segregated neighborhoods with p < 0.05?”  
Indeed, this provides the ingredients for a veritistic treatment of false but approximately 
true claims. In short: scientists are actually communicating (i) true claims about approximations 
although they are uttering (ii) false but approximately true claims. Since the former pose no 
threat to veritism, neither do the latter. For instance, in Bobo and Zubrinsky’s question, the 
aforementioned demographic variables are typical controls in sociological research; the 0.05 p-
value is the default scientific convention. Hence, as bits of common knowledge, these standards 
of approximation are frequently left implicit. In such contexts, utterances of the form “p” 
typically express that p falls within the accepted standards of approximation. Hence, although 
 
7 Sullivan and Khalifa (2019) offer more detailed arguments to this effect. 
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what is said is (strictly speaking) false, what is communicated is a true claim about an 
approximation. Thus, even the “tough” approximations conform with veritism.  
 While both abstractions and approximations offer true answers to relevant questions, 
idealizations cannot, for they are not even approximately true. For instance, the ideal gas law is: 
pVm = RT 
Here, p, Vm, and T denote a gas' pressure, molar volume, and temperature, respectively, 
and R is the ideal gas constant. Some statistical-mechanical models of this law entail, contrary to 
fact, that particles in ideal gases do not interact. This idealization enhances scientists’ 
understanding of the ideal gas law.8 
 Inquisitive veritism treats idealizations as false answers to irrelevant questions. For 
instance, in the aforementioned derivations of the ideal gas law, scientists are not seeking to 
answer, “Do particles in ideal gases interact?” If they were, then they would be sorely misled.9 
Nevertheless, idealizations are epistemically valuable because they are a means to arriving at 
true answers to other, relevant questions. For instance, the aforementioned derivation seeks to 
 
8 Some discussions in this literature conflate the ideal gas law with the statistical-mechanical 
models from which it can be derived. The former is a good approximation of how many gases 
behave macroscopically at low pressure and high temperature. Only the latter entail the existence 
of particles, and only some of these models include false claims about particle interactions. 
Doyle et al. (2019) discuss this conflation’s pernicious effects on debates about understanding. 
9 By contrast, most other equations of state have parameters for particle interactions. In such 
cases, questions about particle interactions are relevant, which is precisely why it would be 
epistemically imprudent to invoke this idealization. 
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answer, e.g., “Why does the ideal gas law hold (at low pressure and high temperature)?” As 
several authors (e.g., Strevens 2008) have noted, whether particles interact is no part of the 
answer to this latter question. Rather, the answer resides in the partition function—which is 
true.10 The idealization earns its keep by making the partition function’s relevant 
consequences—concerning the statistical mechanics underlying the ideal gas law—readily 
apparent. Thus, according to inquisitive veritism, the idealization is of instrumental epistemic 
value. Importantly, this account of idealizations only requires answers to be true or false and 
only requires questions to be relevant or irrelevant. Truth-enough is otiose. 
Thus, the main reasons for rejecting veritism in favor of an axiology predicated on truth-
enough are found wanting. We can do just as well by recognizing that scientists do not deem 
every question about a given phenomenon relevant. Epistemically valuable abstractions, 
approximations, and idealizations depart from the truth only insofar as they answer irrelevant 
questions. Hence, they are compatible with veritism, and do not support U1. 
 
3.2. Empirical Adequacy. Sometimes, scientists forgo accuracy in order to increase 
understanding. However, requiring some parts of understanding to be accurate appears to be a 
good way of distinguishing genuine scientific understanding from the pseudo-understanding 
afforded by crackpot theories. For this reason, some claim that empirical adequacy, not truth, 
fittingly fastens understanding to the facts (De Regt 2017, Rowbottom 2019). 
 
10 The partition function Z is given by a sum over all states of the system in terms of the energy E 
of each state: Z = Se-E/kT. 
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Let empirical statements only describe observable entities, properties, and processes. Let 
empirical questions have empirical statements as true answers. Then, insofar as empirical 
questions are relevant, veritism accommodates this brand of empiricism. Veritism also mimics its 
proponents’ flexible notion of empirical adequacy. For instance, De Regt (2017, 38) writes that 
“there may be variation in how […empirical adequacy is…] ranked and applied in specific 
cases.” Similarly, veritism suggests that different inquiries will deem different empirical 
questions relevant, and thereby allow for different kinds and degrees of empirical adequacy.11 
Like empiricism, veritism also allows some non-empirical questions to be irrelevant, and 
thereby unsuitable as epistemic goals. However, veritism also allows for some relevant non-
empirical questions. As a description of scientific practice, this appears desirable, as many 
scientists seem genuinely interested, if not professionally obligated, to ascertain whether 
unobservables (e.g. leptons) exist. It’s unclear how empiricists about understanding 
accommodate this facet of scientific practice. Thus, all told, construing empirical adequacy as 
encapsulating the idea that some scientific questions are properly answered by empirical 
statements appears to accommodate all of the virtues of appealing to empirical adequacy, and 
arguably avoids some potential pitfalls of this approach.   
 
3.3. Explanation. Many require tight connections between understanding and explanation 
(De Regt 2017, Khalifa 2017, Potochnik 2017, Strevens 2013). It is generally thought that if A 
explains B, then both A and B are true. Moreover, explanations are answers to why-questions. All 
of this accords with veritism.  
 
11 Contrast these with van Fraassen’s (1980) more demanding notion of empirical adequacy. 
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However, de Regt directly challenges the requirement that correct explanations require 
true explanantia.12 For him, intelligible theories can yield falsehoods F that nevertheless explain 
some phenomenon B. Thus, de Regt’s view suggests that F is false, but nevertheless correctly 
answers the question, Why B? This appears incompatible with veritism.  
I offer two replies to de Regt’s challenge. First, his semantics for explanation is 
somewhat implausible (Khalifa 2017, 162-164). If de Regt is correct, then statements of the form 
“A explains B but not-A” should be acceptable. However, statements such as “the patient’s 
allergy explains her symptoms, but the patient has no allergies” border on incoherence. 
Consequently, it’s unclear that falsehoods correctly answer why-questions. Indeed, such 
sentences are more fruitfully regarded as elliptical for true counterfactuals of the form: “if A 
were true, A would explain B.” Thus, whenever questions about what would explain a 
phenomenon are relevant, veritism readily captures these statements’ epistemic value.13 
Second, even if explanations tolerate false explanantia, such explanations do not appear 
epistemically valuable unto themselves. Otherwise, crackpot explanations are difficult to rule 
out. Hence, epistemically valuable but false explanations must be a means to some other 
cognitive good. Indeed, de Regt requires explanations to promote empirical adequacy and 
systematicity. As section 3.2 shows, veritism ably accommodates empirical adequacy; section 
3.6 does the same with systematicity. Thus, even if falsehoods explain, then veritism can account 
 
12 Potochnik’s account of explanation also challenges veritism, albeit less directly. See section 
4.1. 
13 Khalifa’s (2017) requirement that scientific understanding always involve consideration of 
these would-be explanations complements this veritist proposal.  
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for their value. In this way, veritists can still resist de Regt’s understanding objection by denying 
U1, even while granting his controversial semantics.14 
 
3.4. Inference/Reasoning. It seems possible to provide true answers about a topic without 
understanding it. Scientists’ opening of various “black box” models illustrates the demand that 
understanding involve the theoretical and methodological reasons for why something is the 
correct answer. 
 However, this poses no problem for inquisitive veritism. Recall that inquiries are 
networks of interrelated questions and answers. In many scientific inquiries, this networking 
results from answering one question Q with A, and then asking “follow-up” questions about A, 
e.g. “Why A?” or “Why believe that A is a correct answer to Q?”15 Reasons are then answers to 
these follow-up questions. For instance, Bobo and Zubrinsky claim that in-group preferences 
negligibly affect preferences to live in racially homogeneous neighborhoods. Why believe this? 
Because it’s the result of a methodologically sound linear regression analysis, with people’s 
preferences to live in communities of varying levels and kinds of racial diversity as the 
dependent variables, and “feeling thermometer” results, in which respondents rank the “warmth” 
 
14 Note that inquisitive veritism recasts the scientific realism debate in an interesting way. 
Antirealists are inquisitive veritists who (a) take only empirical questions to be relevant and (b) 
take most systematic explanations to be only a means to answering empirical questions; realists 
are veritists who deny these claims. 
15 On pain of regress, some follow-up questions must be irrelevant to a given inquiry. Nevertheless, 
answering enough follow-up questions can contribute to understanding. 
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of their feelings toward various racial groups (including their own), as one of several 
independent variables. Furthermore, understanding frequently improves in proportion to the 
number of follow-up questions correctly answered. Thus, inasmuch as understanding involves 
the recruitment of reasons, it appears to conform with veritism.  
Admittedly, scientists sometimes use falsehoods to infer true answers; the 
aforementioned idealization in deriving the ideal gas law is an example. According to veritism, 
scientists should not cite these falsehoods as answers to follow-up questions. However, even 
here, veritism is unthreatened, for, as already discussed, such falsehoods still function as a means 
to true conclusions that answer relevant questions even if they cannot serve as true answers unto 
themselves.16 Hence, as concerns reasoning, U1 is unsubstantiated. 
 
3.5. Non-Propositional Representations. Much of scientific understanding involves non-
propositional representations, e.g. models and diagrams. For this reason, some have turned to 
denotation and other non-propositional forms of representational success as a way to 
accommodate understanding-providing falsehoods. Roughly, the thought is that such falsehoods 
still are sufficiently tethered to the world by denotation, but the added slack afforded by 
eschewing truth allows them to provide greater understanding. 
 This stands in tension with veritism, as (non-elliptical) answers to questions are 
propositional. However, this tension is illusory. Even when construed non-propositionally, 
 
16 Of course, reasoning with falsehoods is frequently (but not always) unreliable. However, 
veritism presumably requires all epistemically valuable means to be effective at answering 
relevant questions and not merely intended to do so. 
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scientific representations are widely thought to support “surrogative inference;” very roughly, 
competent and informed users can take statements about the representational source as premises 
and draw deductively valid or inductively warranted conclusions about the target (Suárez 2004). 
Surrogative inferences are sound when their conclusions are true. Let a scientific representation 
A of B be successful in context C just in case the sound surrogative inferences that appeal to A in 
their premises have conclusions that correctly answer every relevant question about B in C.17 
Such a formulation requires neither A nor B to be propositions. In this way, non-propositional 
representation can be seen as derivative of the surrogative inferences that are consonant with 
veritism. 
 
3.6. Systematicity. One might think that even if one can provide true answers to relevant 
questions, one’s understanding suffers if those answers do not cohere in the proper way. Such 
coherence is partly a function of the explanatory and inferential relations discussed above, but 
sometimes, the claim appears to be that even if two bodies of statements were inferentially and 
explanatorily articulated to the same degree, they could differ in terms of global properties or 
theoretical virtues, such as simplicity and scope (De Regt 2017, Elgin 2017). Call a healthy 
balance of these virtues “systematicity,” and assume that it is an epistemically valuable feature of 
understanding.  
 
17 Importantly, this account of representational success does not require representations to be 
perfectly accurate. Specifically, a representation may underwrite surrogative inferences with 
false conclusions, so long as these conclusions answer no relevant questions. See section 3.1 for 
examples. 
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Unfortunately, few theories of understanding unpack systematicity in any detail. I offer 
one proposal. Should this miss the mark, it behooves veritism’s critics to propose alternatives. To 
begin, systematicity is not itself an answer to any question. But certain propositions—
paradigmatically, invariant generalizations or “lawlike statements”—drive this systematicity. If 
these lawlike statements are true, then their suitability for answering questions such as, “What do 
these seemingly disparate phenomena have in common?” seems to be precisely why the web of 
commitments comprising an inquirer’s understanding exhibits a certain kind of systematicity. In 
such cases, veritism clearly bestows epistemic value upon these lawlike statements. 
 Indeed, section 3.1 shows that these lawlike statements need only be approximately true 
in order to accord with veritism in this way. But could lawlike statements that fall short of this 
threshold still secure epistemically valuable kinds of systematicity? Those resistant to veritism 
sometimes suggest that Newtonian mechanics fits the bill. While that’s debatable, let’s grant, if 
only for the sake of argument, that Newtonian mechanics does not provide an approximately true 
answer to the question, “What do tidal patterns, planetary orbits, swinging pendula, falling 
apples, etc. have in common?” Then, we need some reason to think that Newtonian mechanics 
isn’t “systematic” in the same way as, e.g., conspiracy theories. After all, ex hypothesi, it is 
claiming that various phenomena are related in ways that they are not. Even here, veritism offers 
a tidy solution: unlike conspiracy theories, classical mechanics’ lawlike statements would still be 
an effective means for making predictions and thus for answering empirical questions (see 
section 3.2). In other words, veritism would still imbue these statements with instrumental 
epistemic value. Thus, whether a lawlike generalization—the engine of systematicity—is true or 
not, veritism does it justice. Yet again, U1 can be rejected. 
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4. Understanding’s Non-Epistemic Value. Thus, insofar as understanding consists of a 
systematic, inferentially and explanatorily interconnected web of propositional and non-
propositional representations that answer relevant questions, understanding objections do not 
undermine veritism. This covers nearly everything that has been propounded as epistemically 
valuable about understanding. Nevertheless, some loose ends remain. In such cases, veritists 
might challenge understanding objections’ second premise, U2. On this line, veritists thereby 
deny the epistemic value of certain features of understanding. For purposes of illustration, I 
pursue this second strategy with respect to two features of understanding: salience and skill. In 
both cases, I argue that veritism captures everything that is epistemically valuable about these 
aspects of understanding (thereby extending the critique of U1), and that their lingering 
remainders lack epistemic value (thereby mounting critiques of U2.)18 
 
4.1. Salience. Potochnik (2017, 95) holds that “idealizations contribute to understanding 
by representing as-if to the end of [i] depicting a causal pattern, thereby [ii] highlighting certain 
aspects of that phenomenon (to the exclusion of others) and revealing connections with other, 
possibly disparate phenomena that embody the same pattern or, in some cases that are exceptions 
to that pattern.”  
This is plausibly interpreted as assigning only instrumental epistemic value to 
idealizations. Consider [i]: the depiction of causal patterns. Strictly speaking, depictions need not 
be accurate, so this might suggest that Potochnik has provided a genuine alternative to veritism. 
However, inaccurate causal depictions do not seem to have any epistemic value unto themselves. 
 
18 Sullivan and Khalifa (2019) offer further arguments to this effect. 
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Presumably, they serve some further end. Indeed, the passage above suggests that Potochnik 
requires understanding-conferring causal depictions to [ii] highlight aspects of phenomena and 
reveal connections between phenomena.  
Hence, if this challenges veritism, then it is because “highlighting and revealing” is an 
epistemically valuable feature of understanding. Furthermore, such a proposal is plausible: those 
who understand frequently notice things that others do not. So, let’s consider whether 
highlighting possesses epistemic value that eludes veritism; “revealing” admits of similar 
treatment. 
First, a small semantic point: the verb highlight is naturally glossed as entailing a kind of 
accurate representation. If x highlights y, then y exists; if x highlights that p, then p is true. 
Furthermore, suppose that one’s representation “pseudo-highlighted” an aspect of a 
phenomenon, e.g. it vividly represented the phenomenon as having a property that it did not 
actually have. In isolation, such representations’ epistemic value is mysterious, to say the least. 
However, true claims need not be highlighted. So perhaps this remainder is epistemically 
valuable in a manner that eludes veritism. Unfortunately, Potochnik says little about how to fund 
the difference between highlighted and non-highlighted aspects of a phenomenon.19 Following 
Koralus (2014), a highlighted truth might simply be one that answers a relevant question. After 
all, those truths that serve our most pressing inquiries seem especially attention-grabbing. 
However, this proposal dovetails seamlessly with inquisitive veritism.  
 
19 Elgin’s discussion of exemplification exhibits similar lacunae as Potochnik’s notion of 
highlighting. 
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So, for argument’s sake, let’s propose an alternative on Potochnik’s behalf: that salience 
captures the difference between highlighted and non-highlighted truths. The problem is that any 
conceivable epistemic good or its exact opposite can be made salient. Crucially, in the latter 
case, our epistemic situation frequently worsens as a result of this salience. (Consider, for 
instance, the falsehoods and misunderstandings made salient in certain fringe social media 
bubbles.) This suggests that salience has no inherent epistemic value: everything hinges on 
what’s being made salient. Consequently, if salience is what puts a truth on the highlight reel, 
then, contra U2, highlighted truths appear to have no greater epistemic value than non-
highlighted truths. Hence, highlighting has no epistemic value over and above what veritism 
counsels.  
 
4.2. Skills. Understanding frequently is thought to involve more than the possession of 
information. It also involves some kind of ability or skill (De Regt 2017, Newman 2012, 
Wilkenfeld 2013). However, if such abilities are no more than the capacity to answer relevant 
questions correctly or to make inferences that ultimately lead to such answers, then we have 
already seen that veritism readily accounts for their epistemic value. If, on the other hand, the 
abilities involve more than this, then we are owed an argument as to why they are epistemically 
valuable. After all, both questions and the reasoning that delivers their answers are quite varied, 
so it’s not obvious that anything of epistemic value eludes their purview. To my knowledge, no 
such argument has been made. Moreover, abilities accrue much non-epistemic value. For 
example, being able to do things gives us a sense of accomplishment, makes us employable, 
increases our prospects of survival, etc. Perhaps these non-epistemic benefits account for any 
 18 
value that abilities have in excess of the epistemic value captured by veritism. This, however, is 
cold comfort for purveyors of understanding objections. 
 
5. Conclusion. I have argued that any epistemically valuable feature of understanding is either a 
true answer to a question or a means to providing such an answer. These features include truth-
enough, empirical adequacy, explanation, inference, non-propositional representation, and 
systematicity. Other features of understanding, such as salience and cognitive skill, appear to 
have only distinctive non-epistemic value. If the preceding arguments are sound, then I have 
succeeded in showing that scientists who only aim for true answers to relevant questions would 
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